Preface
I decided to research the issue of joint operations in the "deep battle area" to get a better grasp on causes of numerous issues between the Army and Air Force on who is in charge of that part of the battlefield. In a former job as an Observer-Controller at Brigade through Corps levels, I experienced this same issue between Army commanders. Now, as a student at a senior service college, I find the issue exists at the joint level.
The issue of integrating the battlefield to allow multiple services (joint) to attack targets in the same vicinity has existed since aircraft were first used in a combat role to support ground troops. However, until after the Vietnam conflict, reliance on nuclear weapons and limited technology provided natural separations and, at the same time, mutual support and integration. Ground forces concentrated close-in because of limited acquisition and attack capabilities. The Air Force concentrated farther out because of a lack of precision attack capabilities to service individual high payoff targets close-in.
Electronic attack methods (EW, jamming, etc.) were limited. This contributed to Air Force reliance on the Army for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) as it traversed into enemy territory to attack deep targets. The Army relied on the Air Force for battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and close air support (CAS) because of limited range in artillery systems and survivable attack helicopters.
The shift in support and integration relationships between the Services is the result of three occurrences: 1) changes in roles and missions dictated by the demise of the Soviet vii Union (threat); 2) increases in acquisition and attack capabilities within the Services brought on by a pursuit of technology to defeat the Soviet threat, and; 3) the resulting overlaps in capabilities between the Services created by this technology.
First, since the demise of the Soviet Union, the US has no credible conventional threat. As a result, Services face reductions in force structure and shrinking budgets.
The result is competition for legitimacy, dollars, and relevancy. This type competition causes parochial thinking and pursuit of additional roles and missions as justification for additional funds and relevancy in future operations. Force, indicate a lack of consensus on who is responsible for the integrated employment of assets beyond the FSCL. This lack of consensus divided rather than integrating combat operations. The FSCL was used as the dividing line for separating areas of responsibility between the Services. It's intended purpose has always been facilitating integration.
The study first analyzes the role of doctrine in the integration process at the operational level. An assessment of basic guidelines, terminology, and control measures is then conducted. The results are contrasted with lessons learned and current operational issues to arrive at shortfalls or fallacies in doctrine. Considering the results of this comparative analysis, suggested corrective actions are made to resolve the issues. The study uses Operation Desert Storm (ODS) as the basis since it encompasses the latest doctrine and technology.
The study concludes that current joint doctrine does not adequately establish procedures for integrating assets beyond the FSCL (deep battle area). The most prevalent shortfalls are comprehensive terminology, control measures, and doctrinal references,
Introduction
Control of joint assets employed beyond the fire support coordination line, regardless of boundaries, is the responsibility of the Joint Force Air Component Commander.
-US Air Force Position.
Control of assets (fires) within the boundaries of the ground maneuver
commander is the responsibility of that ground maneuver commander.
-US Army Position. 
The Problem

Thesis Statement
The thesis of this study is that joint doctrine does not provide the necessary directives 
Doctrinal Assessment
The 
Doctrine Defined
Military Doctrine-presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative. It provides the instilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking and assists a commander in determining the proper course of action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of the decision. Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. 1 Joint Doctrine-fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. 2 To be totally effective, joint doctrine should be flexible enough to allow the combatant commander to use it as a guide to fit his particular situation. Yet, it must be descriptive and directive enough to require service components to function in a unified and synchronized manner. Doctrine must have a clear language (terminology and graphics), and must be precise in its principles. Above all, it must be understood and accepted by those who must execute it. 
Doctrinal References
Deep Battle Doctrine
Operations beyond the front line of troops, often referred to as the "deep battle or deep operations area," require the synchronized and integrated efforts of all services and all available assets. Ground commanders traditionally use this area to set the conditions for the close battle. Air commanders traditionally use this area for strategic attack, offensive counter air (OCA), and air interdiction operations. From a joint perspective, this is where tactics end and operational and strategic operations become the focus. From the operational perspective, deep operations for ground and air are referred to as joint and interdiction operations, and are contained in the fundamental principles of operational art.
Two of the applicable fundamental elements of operational art are synergy, and simultaneity and depth.
Considering a peer competitor concept, while the close battle is waged near the forward line of troops (FLOT) or forward edges of the battle area (FEBA), joint and combined assets interdict enemy forces, in depth, out to the limits of their weapon systems. Strategic and joint assets also strike at the enemy's center of gravity and war making abilities. This concept provides a synergistic effect on the enemy and prevents his follow-on-forces from massing with a well coordinated effort. The synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions, enables Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit. 3 The fact that multiple Services participate simultaneously in this "deep battle,"
dictates that joint doctrine must clearly delineate roles and responsibilities. Control measures must be focused to facilitate rather than eliminate joint and combined operations. The doctrine or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) must be simple and incorporated in all peacetime training and exercises to ensure all service personnel are well versed on the operational parameters. This process will reduce the risk of fratricide, exploit overlaps in capabilities, eliminate redundant engagements, and enhance joint cooperation and operations. A comprehensive joint doctrine will also facilitate simultaneity and depth-the foundations of deep operations. Again, the intent of the simultaneity and depth concept is to bring force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner, that is within the decision making cycle of the opponent. 
Doctrine Evaluation
Joint doctrine does not provide a battlefield framework as a guide that delineates the JFC's area of operation for deep attack, interdiction, air interdiction, interdiction fires, deep supporting fires, or joint precision interdiction (functions and effects). This is partially contributed to the fact that several of these terms or phrases are effects, based on an intended outcome rather than a specific target at a particular point on the battlefield.
Perhaps this is one of the primary shortcomings. It is difficult to picture how the numerous operations are synchronized and integrated to attain the synergistic effects desired. Figure 
-Desert Storm Deep Battle Observations
Terminology is the foundation on which doctrine and procedures are based.
Terminology describing an operation employing airborne maneuver forces, artillery, tactical air, and remotely piloted vehicles must be absolutely concise and universally understood. Without common understanding in language, probabilities of mission failure and fratricide increase. A control and coordination measure that integrates and synchronizes lethal assets like the ATACMS, Apache helicopters and B-52 bombers, while special operation forces, reconnaissance elements, and civilians may be within 100s of meters, must be absolutely understood and universally applied! Conversely, the FSCL, a measure used for this purpose, was interpreted differently by air and ground forces during ODS.
Everyone must use and understand common terms-maneuver commander and fire supporter, Army and Air Force, and our allies. The most important and misunderstood term in this war (ODS) seemed to be the FSCL.
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FSCL
The FSCL can be traced back to 1961. It replaced the old bomb safety line and was defined as a no-fire line between corps and higher echelons, and as a bomb line for ground and air forces.
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Of special note it separated fires between two ground units (corps and higher echelons-field army) and separated fires (bombs) between ground and air. Ground commanders had few systems to fire or maneuver beyond the FSCL.
This allowed the air effort to focus on the area beyond the FSCL with strategic attack and interdiction.
The current definition of the FSCL as found in JP 1-02:
Fire Support Coordination Line-a line established by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander to ensure coordination of fires not under the commander's control but which may effect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate the fires of air, ground, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the land or amphibious force commander provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. Over time, roles, responsibilities, and capabilities resulted in changes in interpretations of application for the FSCL. Table 1 provides a synopsis of current Service interpretations of its functions and uses. 
The FSCL In Operation Desert Storm
The initial FSCL for ODS was established along the Saudi berm. The berm was a defensive measure established along the Saudi-Iraqi border. The fact that coalition forces fought an air war followed by a ground war, contributed to the initial FSCL being a "restrictive" measure as opposed to the "permissive" measure from the start. Since the Air Force was the primary Service involved in combat operations beyond the FSCL, there were no prevailing reasons for other Services to control operations beyond. Problems started and grew from this point.
The establishment of the FSCL on an international boundary restricted the corps' ability to shape the battlefield and caused most of the corps fires to occur inside of the FSCL. 9 The continuing confusion at CENTCOM level over the moving of FSCLs and their use by four different corps finally led to the implementation of a CENTCOM FSCL by General Horner, the JFACC. 10 The definition of the FSCL as contained in Joint doctrine contributes to improper uses of this type. There are three problems with the definition that foster these problems. Again, the FSCL is a very important, but controversial coordination measure. The level of controversy between the Services surrounding its use and meaning, dictates joint resolution. This is not an issue to be left to interpretation.
The lack of common understood joint fire support doctrine and the parochial interpretation of fire support coordination measures caused significant problems in fire support coordination, particularly at EAC. Unlike the Army, the US Marine Corps interprets the FSCL as authority to fire beyond the FSCL, regardless of boundaries, without coordination, the Air Force interprets the FSCL as a restrictive fire support coordination measure, directly opposed to the joint and Army definition. 15 There are additional points to considered for a complete understanding of the FSCL. 
Deep (Battle) Operations
The area beyond the FSCL has no universally accepted name. Figure 2 provides terms associated with operations that occur in this area with indications of where they may appear in relation to the FSCL. In the absence of an official title, the area is labeled according to the functions performed.
The Army labels this area "deep operations." 17 The term "deep battle" is used throughout this study and some Army references to limit the scope to physical combat.
Army deep operations focus on the enemy's C2, logistics, and firepower. Deep operations occur within a ground commander's AO, but is more of a function than an effect. Like interdiction, deep operations focus on uncommitted enemy forces. Deep operations are conducted in conjunction with close operations for a synergistic effect.
The Army further defines deep operations by target sets. For example, in the defense, the corps' initial deep operation will normally focus on the Combined Arms Army (CAA) units and support systems to the rear of the main defensive belt. 18 This technique assists the corps in isolating the current close battle and fighting the enemy in depth.
In general, Air Force references refer to functions or effects as opposed to a particular target set or place on the battlefield close support, interdiction, and strategic attack.
However, two references, JFACC Primer and AFM 2-1, refer to interdiction occurring beyond the FSCL (a particular place). In Air Force doctrine, interdiction disrupts, delays, or destroys an enemy's military potential before it can be used against friendly forces.
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The area beyond the FSCL then is simply a place where the Air Force conducts interdiction, strategic attack, counter air, etc. it's where the JFACC operates.
Joint doctrinal manuals used in this study do not define a deep battle or operation area. There is also no reference to the FSCL's use as a boundary or delineation line for interdiction. Joint doctrine refers to two areas that do encompass the FSCL (the deep battle area), but on a much larger scale. These two geographical areas are the area of responsibility and area of operation. 20 Note that both are general, referring to the overall battlefield rather than any particular part.
Area of Responsibility (AOR)-the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.
Area of Operation (AO)-an operational area is defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.
Interdiction
Great disconnect between the Air Force and Army concerning the use of BAI and the application of the FSCL…The terms BAI and AI need clarification.
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The only common term or function that encompasses the activities around the FSCL is interdiction. This is because of the broad scope of interdiction and the fact that it is a function, aimed at effects. As a function, interdiction has specific objectives.
Interdiction aims to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.
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The JFC should not apply strict geographic boundaries to interdiction but should plan for its theater-wide application, coordinating across boundaries or between sub-elements, to take full advantage of the effect of interdiction at the operational level. 23 When applied at the tactical or operational levels, near the FSCL, interdiction is provided by any Service, with any weapon system. It is directed against follow-on-forces, air defenses, supplies, C3, and other targets that are not already affecting friendly operations. The flexibility included in the interdiction concept also fosters varying interpretations on its application ( Table 2) . As revealed in Table 2 , the interdiction concept is interpreted differently. Although the definition is straight-forward, it is all but impossible to universally apply when there are as many varying interpretations. Because of its universal application in all parts of the battlespace, it will inevitably cross Service roles and responsibility lines, creating additional controversy. The FSCL is not a solution for separating these overlaps because of varying interpretation of its functions.
The varying interpretations of CAS verses BAI verses AI, also had a negative impact on operations during ODS. Initially, the FSCL was along the Saudi-Iraqi border (the berm). As a result, all mission, to include reconnaissance, required clearance through the Air Force. Since the Air Force position was that anything beyond the FSCL was interdiction, and, interdiction was the domain of the JFACC, ground commanders were hampered from setting the conditions for the attack.
Because the Air Force absolutely would not fly short of the FSCL before G-Day, we kept the FSCL in close to facilitate air attack of division and corps high priority targets. This caused two problems. Every fire mission or AH-64 attack beyond the FSCL had to be carefully and painstakingly cleared with the Air Force. Even counterfire required this lengthy process. Equally bad, air sorties beyond the FSCL were completely the domain of the Air Force. VII Corps could nominate targets beyond the FSCL, but could never be sure they would be attacked.
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There are over ten similar issues raised by ground commanders on an inability to conduct "deep operations." This is partially due to a lack of joint recognition for deep battle as an operational concept. The area beyond the border (berm) or FSCL, immediately to the ground forces' front, an area that they would be required to attack into, was virtually inaccessible for reconnaissance or preparation. In essence, the area beyond the FSCL was an area that might be called "No Man's land, being a part of Grand
Tartary." 25 ODs ended on a note of frustration on the part of both Services over this issue. 
Notes
Graphic Control Measures
The situation prompted the violation of established doctrine and development of new fire support control measures (Reconnaissance interdiction Planning Line (RIPL) and Artillery Deconfliction Line, and TTP for fire support at Army level during Operation Desert Storm.
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In order to obtain the synergistic effects of joint, simultaneous, deep operations, control measures must be clear and concise, universally understood, and capable of rapid dissemination when the situation changes. Commanders, Army and Air Force, found themselves wanting for fire control measures to expedite their operations during ODS.
Basic graphical control measures were inadequate for integrating, synchronizing, and facilitating unit or Service operations. Measures implemented during the operation were beneficial for the most part, but also caused confusion because they were non-doctrinal and had no universally understood definitions or applications.
After reviewing joint and service doctrine, there are three universally used graphical control measures associated with deep operations: 1) Boundaries; 2) Phase Lines; and 3) FSCL. The FSCL was discussed earlier.
Doctrinal Control Measures Boundary
The basic boundary has existed since ground forces. Its use is universally understood and is not contested except in the case of interdiction. The official definition provides clarity to its use.
Boundary A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and Deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.
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Note that by official definition, air is unconstrained by the boundary. It can therefore be interpreted that Interdiction is not limited or controlled by the boundary.
Phase Line
The phase line, like the boundary, is universally used and understood and not contested.
Phase Line-A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually a terrain feature extending across the zone of action.
and is intended as a tactical (rapid changes) line as opposed to an operational one. As stated in the definition, the boundary technically applies only to ground forces; the phase line applies to all military operations, but is not universally accepted other than in the ground maneuver community.
Doctrinal Implications
A survey conducted after ODS revealed that participants (staffs) felt that control measure did ensure cooperation between forces. 4 One hundred seventy-nine (179) voted "yes," 144 voted "no." When questioned if they were too restrictive, 157 replied "yes," 1093 replied "no." A follow-up question asked respondents to "describe any difficulties with control measures." Of the 401 responding, the most prominent issue was difficulties with the FSCL. The non-doctrinal use of this control measure caused great confusion and concern. What is unclear is from the surveys is whether control measures facilitated control and cooperation between ground forces, or Army and Air Forces.
Either way, it supports findings in lessons learned that the FSCL is a universally "misunderstood" measure. Chapter 5
Initiatives And Recommendations
Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise, and use, new methods of cooperation…There can never be too many projectiles in a battle. This study finds that several of these solutions are applicable and needed. However, needed above all is a set of guidelines that clearly designate roles and responsibilities for the Services, and provide directives on how Services will operate in a joint environment. Although these agreements are a first step, they will probably not resolve the issues. 
Joint Pub 3-09
Prior to publishing JP This definition clarifies several issues identified in ODS. First, it labels the FSCL as a corps tactical measure so that all will recognize that it applies to a particular corps'
sector. Additionally, subordinate, supporting, adjacent, and tactical air units will know exactly with whom coordination is required. Second, it requires coordination with the tactical air commander prior to implementation or change. Third, it eliminates the guess work of who can attack beyond it and with whom coordination is required. Fourth, it adds the old coordinating altitude back to protect aircraft either supporting the corps or transiting the corps sector to attack deep. It requires the Air and Artillery to coordinate if they are going to transit the others attack space. Finally, it removes the ambiguity of application-it applies to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines.
The next correction to JP 3-09 is that it must add additional fire support coordination measures that are applicable at the operational level. This can be a RIPL, DBSL, or as proposed by the Institute for Defense, a Joint Fire Support Coordination Line (JFSCL). 4 The name of the measure is not important. What is important is that some type measure is entrenched in doctrine, that can be added to joint and service curriculums doctrines, and TTPs. Additionally, this will eliminate the theater specific operational measures that were "implemented on the fly" during ODs.
Lastly, JP 3-09 needs to clearly address the distinction between joint fire support and interdiction. The two concepts are used interchangeably as is air interdiction and interdiction. This is part of the current problem with fires, deep battle and interdiction.
Additionally, the JFACC's role requires clear articulation to ensure cooperation and integration beginning at the planning process. 
Joint
Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC)
Synonymous with the concept of fire support is a fire support element (FSE) to integrate and synchronize fire support assets and their effects with the maneuver concept.
From company through corps levels, this concept has proven to be indispensable. The The intent of joint doctrine is to provide a set of fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. Although ODS was a resounding success, this may have been due more to the ingenuity of the leaders, soldiers, airman, sailors, and marines, than a well refined doctrine. Also contributing to the success was the strategy of fighting a sequential war instead of a simultaneous ground-air war. This minimized the impact of the doctrinal shortfalls.
The FSCL issue has gone unresolved since prior to ODS. A control measure of this importance-coordinating the efforts of multiple Services, assisting in fratricide prevention, and facilitating ground-soldier preparation for going face-to-face with an enemy, is too important to be debated. This measure requires universal use and understanding by all Services. There should be no individual Service interpretations and applications. This is the role of joint doctrine-if the Services cannot resolve the issue, joint doctrine should. This will provide three benefits.
First, a joint directed definition with specific rules for the FSCL and other control measures would facilitate training in Service schools. Less time is lost debating whether a particular measure is right for a particular situation, or whether one service or the other has the correct interpretation. Second, it would facilitate servicemember transfer from one theater to another. As of today, when servicemembers transfer from Europe to Korea, they have to forget the RIPL, and learn the DBSL. When this same servicemember transfer stateside to III Corps, the servicemember has to forget both, and become familiar with the BSL. This causes confusion and detracts from learning, transfer of knowledge, and cooperation. That does not exist with the lack of specificity contained in joint doctrine on control and coordination measures. Most of the current doctrinal manuals were updated after ODS.
However, problems identified by field commanders were not adequately address. The
